Tuesday, June 08, 2004
Nukes
A comment on a recent article by M. V. Ramana & R. Rajaraman in thehindu on Indias nuclear options.
[A recent example of a serious accident involving a missile occurred on February 23, 2004 at the Sriharikota High Altitude Range. Engineers were testing a motor for the Agni missile when it caught fire and exploded, killing at least six people. If such an accident were to occur in an Agni missile loaded with a nuclear warhead, it could well lead to the dispersal of fissile material (plutonium or enriched uranium) into the atmosphere, potentially causing thousands of fatal cancers among the nearby population.
The above estimate of casualties is not for a nuclear explosion, but only for the detonation of the chemical explosive in the weapon. This chemical explosion could well trigger a nuclear explosion. An accidental nuclear explosion with a yield of 15 kilotons, the same as the weapon detonated over Hiroshima, would destroy over 5 square kilometres from the combined effects of blast and firestorms. Over 24 square kilometres would be subject to radioactive fallout at such levels that half the healthy adult population would die of radiation sickness. If this were to happen in the vicinity of a large South Asian city, several hundreds of thousands of people would die. In addition, such an explosion, especially in times of crises, might be assumed to be a nuclear attack and lead to a nuclear response. Thus an accidental nuclear explosion may even initiate a nuclear war, which could cause millions of casualties.]
Notice how the authors are careful to build up the FUD.
The missile was being *tested* when it caught fire. If a motor was being tested, it is conceivable that the parts being tested had some of the previously unproved parts or technology in them, and testing probably means what we ppl in s/w industry are familiar with, that of applying stress variables near the applicable limits of the machine. A missile being tested will not be loaded with nuclear weapons nor a missile in storage which is in storage be subjected to the kind of stress that it is subjected to while being tested.
Now see the claim : the chemical explosion could trigger a nuclear explosion.
so they are referring to missiles which are stored with the warheads. not the ones being tested.
They further claim that if the nuke explosion caused by a chemical explosion were to occur near a large city several hundreds might die.
Now wait for a moment and think, why would a missile be stored in the vicinity of any such cities? The logic points to the fact that they would be stored in places where the govt has easy access to controlling inflow and outflow of people, And it should also be a region where the assembling of the infrastructure to deliver the missile be relatively easy and not under prying eyes. neither of which is easy near a city. I can not think of any advantage the govt will get in storing it near a city. The more chances are also that they will be stored near the borders so that we will get more range out of them. Now think how many cities are near our borders..
Now take up the second assumption, that in case of a crises, it will be assumed to be a nuclear strike and escalate to a nuclear strike. -- But whom do we suspect? unlike the case of US and USSR, we have two or more enemy states surrounding us (more in the sense the jihadi framework) we cannot just aim and shoot before we know who at least did it, and that requires at least some proof.
now look at their recommendation
[Our second recommendation is that the UPA Government immediately stop installing early warning systems. These systems are intended to detect incoming ballistic missiles and, it is hoped, inform decision makers that nuclear war has begun before the warheads themselves explode. The last few years have witnessed the acquisition of key components of an early warning network, including the Green Pine radar from Israel. There have also been reports of attempts to purchase the Arrow anti-ballistic system. However, as we have calculated in some detail elsewhere, these systems simply cannot offer more than a few minutes of warning in the South Asian context. This is grossly insufficient for decision making in any meaningful sense of the term. ]
They fail to realize that these warning systems can act as another mechanism, that of providing a smoke trail after a strike has occurred. With out such a system, the nuclear capability is worse than useful, Since with out knowing who struck us first we can not act. Remember that we have a no first use doctrine. Which effectively means as a corollary that we are ready to suffer a first strike but who ever struck us will not escape unhurt. Remember that we might have around 45 to 60 nukes, and in all probability they are kept in 20 to 30 different sites, if an early warning system gives info that nukes have flown in targeting one or two we can discount it as actual warning as we will still be left with sufficient capability to hurt the enemy. See the example given [In 1995, for instance, a Norwegian scientific rocket launch was interpreted by the Russian early warning system as a possible attack and the matter went all the way up the command chain to President Yeltsin.] This is the typical spurious warning that India need not fear due to the nature of our doctrine, However these warning systems can perform another role too, that of getting the decision making people to safety before the strike, and that is a perfectly valid reason for having them. ¶ 1:33 AM
[A recent example of a serious accident involving a missile occurred on February 23, 2004 at the Sriharikota High Altitude Range. Engineers were testing a motor for the Agni missile when it caught fire and exploded, killing at least six people. If such an accident were to occur in an Agni missile loaded with a nuclear warhead, it could well lead to the dispersal of fissile material (plutonium or enriched uranium) into the atmosphere, potentially causing thousands of fatal cancers among the nearby population.
The above estimate of casualties is not for a nuclear explosion, but only for the detonation of the chemical explosive in the weapon. This chemical explosion could well trigger a nuclear explosion. An accidental nuclear explosion with a yield of 15 kilotons, the same as the weapon detonated over Hiroshima, would destroy over 5 square kilometres from the combined effects of blast and firestorms. Over 24 square kilometres would be subject to radioactive fallout at such levels that half the healthy adult population would die of radiation sickness. If this were to happen in the vicinity of a large South Asian city, several hundreds of thousands of people would die. In addition, such an explosion, especially in times of crises, might be assumed to be a nuclear attack and lead to a nuclear response. Thus an accidental nuclear explosion may even initiate a nuclear war, which could cause millions of casualties.]
Notice how the authors are careful to build up the FUD.
The missile was being *tested* when it caught fire. If a motor was being tested, it is conceivable that the parts being tested had some of the previously unproved parts or technology in them, and testing probably means what we ppl in s/w industry are familiar with, that of applying stress variables near the applicable limits of the machine. A missile being tested will not be loaded with nuclear weapons nor a missile in storage which is in storage be subjected to the kind of stress that it is subjected to while being tested.
Now see the claim : the chemical explosion could trigger a nuclear explosion.
so they are referring to missiles which are stored with the warheads. not the ones being tested.
They further claim that if the nuke explosion caused by a chemical explosion were to occur near a large city several hundreds might die.
Now wait for a moment and think, why would a missile be stored in the vicinity of any such cities? The logic points to the fact that they would be stored in places where the govt has easy access to controlling inflow and outflow of people, And it should also be a region where the assembling of the infrastructure to deliver the missile be relatively easy and not under prying eyes. neither of which is easy near a city. I can not think of any advantage the govt will get in storing it near a city. The more chances are also that they will be stored near the borders so that we will get more range out of them. Now think how many cities are near our borders..
Now take up the second assumption, that in case of a crises, it will be assumed to be a nuclear strike and escalate to a nuclear strike. -- But whom do we suspect? unlike the case of US and USSR, we have two or more enemy states surrounding us (more in the sense the jihadi framework) we cannot just aim and shoot before we know who at least did it, and that requires at least some proof.
now look at their recommendation
[Our second recommendation is that the UPA Government immediately stop installing early warning systems. These systems are intended to detect incoming ballistic missiles and, it is hoped, inform decision makers that nuclear war has begun before the warheads themselves explode. The last few years have witnessed the acquisition of key components of an early warning network, including the Green Pine radar from Israel. There have also been reports of attempts to purchase the Arrow anti-ballistic system. However, as we have calculated in some detail elsewhere, these systems simply cannot offer more than a few minutes of warning in the South Asian context. This is grossly insufficient for decision making in any meaningful sense of the term. ]
They fail to realize that these warning systems can act as another mechanism, that of providing a smoke trail after a strike has occurred. With out such a system, the nuclear capability is worse than useful, Since with out knowing who struck us first we can not act. Remember that we have a no first use doctrine. Which effectively means as a corollary that we are ready to suffer a first strike but who ever struck us will not escape unhurt. Remember that we might have around 45 to 60 nukes, and in all probability they are kept in 20 to 30 different sites, if an early warning system gives info that nukes have flown in targeting one or two we can discount it as actual warning as we will still be left with sufficient capability to hurt the enemy. See the example given [In 1995, for instance, a Norwegian scientific rocket launch was interpreted by the Russian early warning system as a possible attack and the matter went all the way up the command chain to President Yeltsin.] This is the typical spurious warning that India need not fear due to the nature of our doctrine, However these warning systems can perform another role too, that of getting the decision making people to safety before the strike, and that is a perfectly valid reason for having them. ¶ 1:33 AM
